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REPLY TO DR. IRION'S "STATEMENT OF THE CASE"
Dismissal of a complaint, as occurred in the district court here, is justified
only when the allegations of the complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff
does not have a claim. Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co.. 910 P.2d 1218,
1220 (Utah 1996). In determining whether a trial court properly dismissed an
action, a reviewing court assumes that the factual allegations in the complaint are
true and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Id. at 1219. Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, the assertions set
forth in the Snows' amended complaint must be accorded verity. In his
"Statement of the Case," Dr. Irion fails to recognize this principle.
On pages 2 and 3 of his brief, Dr. Irion repeatedly refers to the malignant
tumor on Mrs. Snow's ovary as a "cyst." The Snows' complaint identifies the
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growth as a tumor. Even Dr. Irion's own answer identifies the tumor as a "mass."
Dr. Irion's attempt to transform the tumor into a mere cyst is inappropriate.
Dr. Irion asserts on page 2 of his brief that "Mrs. Snow's cancer has been
successfully treated, and she has since been in remission, with no diagnosis of
recurrent cancer." The affidavit of Mr. and Mrs. Snow which Dr. Irion cites
actually states the facts as follows:
Although we understand there has been no diagnosis of
"recurrent" cancer since Marion's second surgery on
August 13, 2002, we have never been told by any
physician that Marion is in remission or cured from her
cancer.
(R. 57; see also Exhibit "A", attached to this reply brief).
Dr. Irion states that the Snows' complaint alleges he failed to timely
diagnose and treat Mrs. Snow's cancer and timely refer her to an oncologist,
causing "a statistically greater risk for return of ovarian cancer." This summary of
the Snows' complaint inaccurately implies that it contains no claims other than a
damage claim based on increased risk of cancer recurrence. The Snows'
amended complaint very clearly sets forth a number of additional claims. For
example, the Snows allege Dr. Irion actually caused the spread of her cancer and
her need for further surgery and subsequent chemotherapy by rupturing the
tumor as he inappropriately attempted to remove it vaginally. (See TJ20 g of
Amended Complaint, R.13). In addition, the Snows claim Dr. Irion directly injured
-2-

Mrs. Snow's bladder while attempting to perform his vaginal hysterectomy, which
he could have avoided had he proceeded appropriately. (See 1J20 d of Amended
Complaint, R. 12; see also Exhibit "B", attached).
On page 3 of his brief, Dr. Irion asserts: "The Snows make no allegation of
injury beyond their claim that there is a heightened risk that Mrs. Snow's cancer
will return." That assertion is simply inaccurate. (See e.g., ffl{20 d ar>d 9- 21, 23,
24, 27, 28 and 29 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, R. 9-15; see also June 30,
2004 Joint Affidavit of Marion Snow and Roger Snow at R. 56-58).

ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT RULE ON THIS APPEAL
UNTIL THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS DECIDED
MEDVED V. GLENN (SC #20040492).
Dr. Irion contends the decision of the district court should be upheld
because the district court correctly interpreted and applied this Court's decision in
Medved v. Glenn, 2004 WL1065503 (Utah App) and Seale v Gowans. 923 P.2d
1361 (Utah 1996). After this Court issued its opinion in Medved v. Glenn, supra,
the Utah Supreme Court granted Medved's petition for writ of certiorari. Medved
v. Glenn currently pends before the Utah Supreme Court. That Court heard oral
argument in the case on March 1, 2005. It is likely to issue an opinion in Medved
-3-

in the near future. The principle issue in Medved is identical to the principal issue
raised in this appeal. The Supreme Court's decision in Medved is likely to be
dispositive. It is also likely to clarify the holding of Seale v. Gowans. supra. This
Court, therefore, should hold off ruling on this appeal until the Supreme Court has
decided Medved.

II.
THE SNOWS HAVE ALREADY SUSTAINED ACTUAL
INJURY AS A RESULT OF DR. IRION'S NEGLIGENCE.
Dr. Irion asserts: "The Snows fail to allege an actionable injury" (Appellee
brief at p. 10) and "The Snows' allegations of damages do not qualify as an
allegation of present actual injury." (Id. at 9). Finally, he states: "It must be
remembered, Dr. Irion did not give Mrs. Snow cancer." (Id. at 10). According
verity to the Snows' allegations, as this Court must, all of these assertions are
inaccurate.
While it is true that Dr. Irion did not create the malignant tumor he found
while undertaking to remove Mrs. Snow's uterus, he did cause the spread of
cancer which necessitated her second surgery and subsequent treatment when
he ruptured the tumor and allowed its malignant cells to seed throughout her
body. In addition, he was responsible for the lengthy delay in the commencement

-4-

of treatment for the spread of the cancer. (See Amended Complaint at ffljl 0 - 1 5
and 17-18, and 20 -29; R. 9-15). Also, he perforated Mrs. Snow's bladder during
his surgery on her. (See Exhibit "B", attached and R. 12,1J20 d)
In opposing Dr. Irion's motion to dismiss in the district court, Roger and
Marion Snow signed an affidavit attached to their counsel's memorandum. As Dr.
Irion concedes in footnote 2 of his appellee brief, that affidavit is appropriately a
part of the record. It is found at R. 56-58. A copy is attached to this brief as
Exhibit "A". For purposes of this appeal, this Court is bound to accept the
following averments as true: 1
3.

Because Marion was required to have two surgeries and
chemotherapy treatment, she was required to use all of her
family/home leave time from work and then lost her job and all
related benefits, including health and life insurance coverage. She
is no longer able to work.

4.

Marion applied for and was granted Social Security Disability
benefits on November 7, 2003 because of health issues related to
the spread of her ovarian tumor, requiring chemotherapy treatment
and a second surgery. The benefits were deemed retroactive to
December of 2002, shortly after Marion's second surgery. The
monthly payments made by Social Security are substantially less
than Marion's income when she was able to work.

5.

When Marion lost her job, we lost our group health
insurance. We now have COBRA coverage, which is very
costly, and which will expire in February 2005. At that point
we will have no health insurance and Marion will still be too
young for Medicare coverage. It is unlikely we will be able to

1

See. e.g., Whipple v. American Fork Iriqation Co.. 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah

1996).
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obtain other health insurance due to her "pre-existing"
condition.
6.

We have incurred medical bills in excess of $140,000.00 which we
believe are directly attributable to Dr. Irion's substandard care.

7.

Marion is no longer able to perform many daily tasks she
performed before Dr. Irion's surgery in June of 2002. We
attribute her inability to perform many normal activities of
daily living to Dr. Irion's substandard care. We believe that
had Dr. Irion correctly diagnosed and removed Marion's
ovarian tumor, there would have been no necessity for a
second surgery to remove cancer resulting from seeding,
and Marion would not have required the further treatment
and surgery which have significantly reduced her ability to
function.

8.

Since Dr. Irion's negligent removal of Marion's ovarian
tumor, we have suffered a profound diminution of our quality
of life together and cannot participate in many of the
activities we used to enjoy before her injuries.

(R. 57-58; see Exhibit "A", attached).
Clearly, the Snows have alleged significant and very real actual, present
damage resulting from Dr. Irion's negligence. The injuries and damages
described above are all actionable.
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III.
SEALE V. GOWANS DOES NOT HOLD THAT
A CLAIM FOR ENHANCED RISK OF CANCER
RECURRENCE IS INACTIONABLE NOR DOES IT
HOLD THAT A PERSON WITH A PRESENT HARM
MAY NOT ALSO CLAIM A FUTURE HARM.
Dr. Irion sets forth on pages 6 and 7 of his brief the facts in Seale v.
Gowans. That recitation reveals a key fact distinguishing that case from this one.
In Gowans. no suit was filed until the cancer had recurred. There was no
occasion for our Supreme Court to rule on whether an earlier filed complaint
alleging both present and future damages would have been actionable. It is
noteworthy that in Gowans. the party contending for the earlier existence of a
legally cognizable injury was not the patient, but the defending doctor. He did so
in the context of a statute of limitations defense. Our Supreme Court merely held
that he "failed to meet [his] burden to prove that Ms. Seale suffered a legally
cognizable injury when she discovered that the cancer had spread to her lymph
nodes." Our Court found that the doctor, not the patient, had "failed to argue or to
produce evidence that in 1988, Ms. Seale could complain of any actual present
damages." (923 P.2d at 1364-65). Our Supreme Court's conclusion in Gowans
was merely this:
Defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing
that Ms. Seale discovered any legally cognizable injury
-7-

in 1988 and was therefore barred by the statutory time
period when she brought her action in 1991 when the
cancer appeared in her hip.
(Id. at 1365) (emphasis added).
Our Supreme Court's "holding" in Seale v. Gowans is limited: "Damages in
the form of an enhanced risk only are not sufficient to start the running of the
statute of limitations." (Id.) Dr. Irion asks this Court to extend that holding and to
assume our Supreme Court intended to rule that in no case could a patient
herself pursue a claim where the only damage was heightened risk of cancer
recurrence. Our Supreme Court has yet to make such a ruling. If it had, such a
ruling would not justify dismissal of the Snows' claim because they claim very real
and significant present damages resulting from Dr. Irion's negligence in addition
to and wholly apart from Mrs. Snow's heightened risk of cancer recurrence.
Dr. Irion's suggestion that his own understanding and interpretation of
Seale v. Gowans is universal and any other interpretation would upset the
justified expectation of past litigants is demonstrably unsound. He contends:
"Plaintiffs' lawyers in this state have relied on Seale and made informed decisions
not to initiate litigation in cases involving delayed cancer diagnosis until there has
been a recurrence of c a n c e r . . . " (Appellee brief at 8). Actually, any plaintiff's
lawyer aware of present damages sustained as a result of a doctor's negligence
pertaining to the diagnosis of cancer risks committing malpractice by not bringing
-8-

action immediately.

The idea that combining such a claim with a claim for future

loss is fatal to both claims did not gain notice (or notoriety) until this Court's
decision in Medved v. Glenn.

IV.

CONTRARY TO DR. IRION'S SUGGESTION, UHCMA'S
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND STATUTE OF REPOSE
ARE HIGHLY GERMANE TO THIS CONTROVERSY.
In his footnote 6 (Appellee brief at 8), Dr. Irion states
Neither the statute of limitations nor the statute of
repose are issues in this case. Whether the statute of
limitations or the statute of repose could or would
preclude any of the Snows' claims is purely speculative.
. . . These issues are unripe, were not decided by the
trial court, and are not before this Court on appeal.
(Appellee brief, p. 8, fn. 6).
It is easy for Dr. Irion to discount concerns over the running of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act's statute of limitations and statute or repose because
those statutes can only benefit, not harm, him. Those statutes are of
understandably major concern to litigants like the Snows. The Snows addressed
both statutes in their memorandum to the district court (R. 50-51) and in their
brief-in-chief to this Court. (Appellant brief pp. 14-18). Dr. Irion argues: "If this
Court affirms the trial court's dismissal.. ., the Snows will retain the right to file a
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claim for full recovery if Mrs. Snow suffers a future recurrence." This argument
overlooks and trivializes the significant damage the Snows have already
sustained and ignores the deprivation of access to the courts which occurs if Mrs.
Snow does not suffer a future recurrence.

CONCLUSION
The Snows' complaint alleges Dr. Irion's surgical and post operative
negligence caused them significant present, non speculative harms. Those
harms include: perforation of Mrs. Snow's bladder; the seeding and spread of
cancer cells throughout Mrs. Snow's peritoneal cavity; the incurrence of over
$140,000 in medical bills for cancer surgery and chemotherapy which would not
have been necessary but for Dr. Irion's negligence; loss of income, loss of job
and consumption of employment benefits; impairment of earning capacity; loss of
affordable insurance coverage; and quality of life damages.
There was no need to have dismissed the significant portions of the Snows'
claim seeking recovery for these harms merely because another portion of their
claim (increased risk of cancer recurrence) was found to be inactionable.
Our Supreme Court is in process of deciding whether Seale v. Gowans.
supra, really does preclude a plaintiff from alleging, proving and recovering
damages for a heightened risk of cancer recurrence. Until it has decided that
-10-

question and has determined whether this Court's Medved decision needs
modification, this Court should not affirm the district court's dismissal of the
Snows' complaint.
Respectfully submitted this / 3 >

day of May, 2005.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARION SNOW and ROGER SNOW,
Plaintiffs,

JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF
MARION SNOW AND
ROGER SNOW

vs.
Civil No.: 040908601
RICHARD A. IRION, M.D.,
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

Roger and Marion Snow, being first duly sworn, depose and say:
1.

We had two post-operative appointments with Dr. Irion following Marion's

hysterectomy surgery on June 18, 2002. Dr. Irion never personally informed either one
of us at any time during those appointments that the tumor he removed from Marion during
the June 18, 2002 surgery was cancerous.

Dr. Irion made us an appointment with an

oncologist, Dr. Christopher Jolles, who told us about the cancer.
2.

Although we understand there has been no diagnosis of "recurrent" cancer

since Marion's second surgery on August 13, 2002, we have never been told by any
physician that Marion is in remission or cured from her cancer.
3.

Because Marion was required to have two surgeries and chemotherapy

treatment, she was required to use all of her family/home leave time from work and then
lost her job and all related benefits, including health and life insurance coverage. She is
no longer able to work.
4.

Marion applied for and was granted Social Security Disability benefits on

November 7, 2003 because of health issues related to the spread of her ovarian tumor,
requiring chemotherapy treatment and a second surgery. The benefits were deemed
retroactive to December of 2002, shortly after Marion's second surgery. The monthly
payments made by Social Security are substantially less than Marion's income when she
was able to work.
5.

When Marion lost her job, we lost our group health insurance. We now have

COBRA coverage, which is very costly, and which will expire in February 2005. At that
point we will have no health insurance and Marion will still be too young for Medicare
coverage. It is unlikely we will be able to obtain other health insurance due to her "preexisting" condition.
6.

We have incurred medical bills in excess of $140,000.00 which we believe
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are directly attributable to Dr. Irion's substandard care.
7.

Marion is no longer able to perform many daily tasks she performed before

Dr. Irion's surgery in June of 2002. We attribute her inability to perform many normal
activities of daily living to Dr. Irion's substandard care.

We believe that had Dr. Irion

correctly diagnosed and removed Marion's ovarian tumor, there would have been no
necessity for a second surgery to remove cancer resulting from seeding, and Marion would
not have required the further treatment and surgery which have significantly reduced her
ability to function.
8.

Since Dr. Irion's negligent removal of Marion's ovarian tumor, we have

suffered a profound diminution of our quality of life together and cannot participate in many
of the activities we used to enjoy before her injuries.
DATED t h i s 2 § £ ^ y of June, 2004.
•s.s*?^

r~<

^-rJZ^F?^:^
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DATED thia3CT day of,

Roger S.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / %

L^^l^txt^-^

0 S>

day of June, 2004.

jUL*A<Jlsi^

Notary Public

\\2kserver\common\My Files\Snow, MariorAAffidavit of Marion & Roger.06-29-04.wpd
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COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER

SURGEON:

General Surgery Reports
Page

1

David A. Kimball, M.D.

ASSISTANT:
PREOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS:
POSTOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS:
OPERATION PERFORMED:
ANESTHESIA:
HISTORY: This patient is a 61 year old white female who is being operated on by
Dr. Irion for a hysterectomy. I was asked to see the patient during the surgery
because of a perforation of the bladder. Dr. Irion and I discussed the case.
The patient's bladder had been entered and we talked about closure of the
bladder. Once this was accomplished, I came back and did a cystoscopy on the
patient. The indigo was injected intravenously and could be seen to exude from
the ureters bilaterally.
PROCEDURE:

DAVID A. KIMBALL, M.D.

PAT: SNOW, MARION
DIC: David A. Kimball, M.D.
EVD:
/ /
D: 07/07/2002 T: 07/08/2002
C: 89425565 2435 3 - DMAQVS132H
TYPIST: 438 JOB # 22233
BATCH: 26393

